We discuss a modiÿcation of the evolution ary min ority game (EMG) in which agen ts are placed in the n odes of a regular or a ran dom graph. A n eighborhood for each agen t can thus be deÿn ed and a modiÿcation of the usual relaxation dyn amics can be made in which each agen t updates her decision depen din g upon her n eighborhood. We report n umerical results for the topologies of a rin g, a torus an d a ran dom graph chan gin g the size of the neighborhood. We ÿn d the surprisin g result that in the EMG a better coordin ation (a lower frustration ) can be achieved if agen ts base their action s on local in formation disregardin g the global tren d in the self-segregation process.
Introduction
There are a great number of situations in which a many agent system self-organizes by coordinating individual actions. Such coordination is usually achieved by agents with partial information about the system, and in some cases optimizing utility functions that con ict with each other. A similar situation is found in many particles, physical systems. The word "coordination" used in a social or economic context is then replaced by "ordering". Examples are the growth of a crystalline structure or a transition leading to some speciÿc magnetic phase.
Interesting situations arise when the optimal conÿgurations for di erent individuals do collide with each other. This can be due to the nature of the interactions between the particles as in a spin glass, or by boundary conditions, which prevent a global ordering or by the constitutive rules of a system of multiple players that prevent that all agents can win. In these cases it is said that the system displays some degree of frustration. An example of a frustrated multi agent system is given by the evolutionary minority game (EMG) [1] in which many players have to make a binary choice and the winning option is the one made by the minority. The similarities between some variants of the minority game and spin glasses have been discussed in great detail in Ref. [2] .
A macroscopic signature of frustration is that the system can not accommodate into a single, optimal state in which the energy is a minimum, but it relaxes instead to one of many, suboptimal, equivalent conÿgurations that are local minima in the energy landscape. In the random relaxation dynamic that is used for the EMG each player continually modiÿes her choice searching for a winning option. The ÿnal result is that the population is segregated into two parties that take opposite actions. This partition is not unique and also tends to reduce the frustration as much as possible by minimizing the number of losers.
The relaxation process is usually assimilated to the search of a solution of a combinatorial optimization problem in which it is possible a strategy of "divide and conquer" [3] , i.e., circumstances in which one can attempt to divide the system into parts and search for separate optima in each part. Frustration arises when such local solutions can not be reassembled into a global optimum also fulÿlling the boundary conditions.
A relevant example of the study of the global outcome of a local coordination strategy (i.e., involving only a fraction of the system) is Schelling's segregation model [4] . Agents of two kinds are placed in a square grid. The system relaxes to equilibrium allowing any two agents of di erent kinds to exchange places if they are surrounded by, say, a majority of agents of the opposite kind. In the present paper we discuss a relaxation dynamics for the EMG in which we impose a local coordination strategy. We borrow the picture of Schelling's models and place the players in a lattice. It is then possible to associate a neighborhood to each player, and thus implement a local coordination strategy letting each player to adjust her decision to the situation in her neighborhood. We call this model the local evolutionary minority game (LEMG). 1 A previous work in this direction is Ref. [6] in which players are also located on the nodes of a grid, but are endowed with (two) strategies that are selected on the basis of their successful use. This work further imposes that both strategies have to be anticorrelated, i.e., they tend to produce opposite actions with the same input. We stress the evolutionary nature of the present model: players bear no memory of past actions and do not have any strategy in the sense of Ref. [6] , 2 to guide their actions. In spite of this di erence, the e ects of local coordination produce a similar ordered pattern. We pay special attention to the e ects of such a local coordination in the optimization process.
The rules of LEMG
We ÿrst consider the traditional EMG. This involves N players that make one binary decision (0 or 1). Each player has a probability p i ; i = 1; 2; : : : ; N of choosing, say, 0. Each player receives one point if her decision places her in the minority, and loses a point otherwise. When her account of points falls below 0, she changes p i → p i with p i ∈ [p i − p; p i + p], at random, and p1. Re ective boundary conditions are imposed at p i = 0; 1. All agents are assumed to update the corresponding p i 's synchronically. It is customary to display the self-organization of the system through the probability density function P(p) obtained in a statistical ensemble of systems that are allowed to relax to equilibrium. The value of P(p) dp is the fraction of the population having a probability between p and p + dp of choosing, say, 0. When the probabilistic relaxation is used, the asymptotic function P(p) has a U-shape with two symmetric peaks at p 0 and 1 thus indicating that the N agents have segregated into two parties making opposite decisions. The relaxation process corresponds to the minimization of an "energy" function [7] given by the standard deviation deÿned by 2 
where P(A) is the probability distribution of parties of A agents that have chosen 0. The value of 2 depends upon the properties of P(p). In Ref. [7] it is proven that
where p s = p s P(p) dp. At equilibrium the linear dependence of E on N disappears, and 2 turns out to be an extensive magnitude proportional to N . A minimization of E is equivalent to ÿnd a distribution P(p) with the smallest possible number of losers. In fact, 2 is related to the number of losers because
where w (') is the number of winners (losers) and · · · represents an ensemble average.
If one assumes na vely P(p) = (p − This deÿnition may also be used for any system involving a game with multiple players. The value F = 0 corresponds to a situation such as the "majority game" in which a player is a winner if her decision is the same as the majority. This leads to situations that can be assimilated to a ferromagnetic phase (all the players (spins) have chosen the same option (orientation)). In the EMG there are less winners than losers, and therefore 1 2 ¡ F EMG 6 1. The lowest possible frustration for the EMG is reached when the N (odd) agents are coordinated to produce the largest possible minority, i.e., (N − 1)=2. Thus the lowest possible frustration for a ÿnite minority game is F * = (1 + 1=N )=2. We now turn to the LEMG in which the ith player makes her decision depending upon the situation in her neighborhood N i . In order to deÿne the neighborhoods we assume three possible spatial orderings. Two of them correspond, respectively, to a one-dimensional (1D) or a square two-dimensional (2D) regular array with periodic boundary conditions (i.e., respectively, a ring and a torus). In the third arrangement, the agents are placed in the nodes of a random undirected graph with a ÿxed number of neighbors for each agent so that a reciprocity relationship is automatically fulÿlled (if node i is taken to be linked to node j, the reciprocal is also true). All neighborhoods are assumed to have the same (odd) number n of agents (we consider that i ∈ N i ).
The rules of the LEMG are the same as for the EMG except for the important di erence that an agent wins or loses points depending whether she is, or she is not, in the minority of her own neighborhood. No attention is paid to the agents that do not belong to N i . The LEMG coincides with the usual EMG when N i coincides with the complete N -agent system. In the regular orderings the neighborhoods are respectively a segment or a square with an odd number of agents. The only agent that updates her p i is located at the center of the square or segment. Notice that an agent may be in the minority (a winner) in her neighborhood and in the majority (a loser) when the entire system is considered, and vice versa.
Let us consider the simple example of an inÿnite linear chain of agents and a neighborhood with n = 3. We deÿne R i to be the probability that the ith agent belongs to the minority of N i . We can thus write
where −∞ 6 i 6 ∞. The probability that all agents are winners is R = i R i . Obviously, R = 1 if and only if R i = 1; ∀i. This is possible only if p i = 1 and p i±1 = 0. This corresponds to a pattern in which 0's and 1's alternate with a period of 2. Larger neighborhoods give also rise to periodic solutions with larger (even) periods. Any ÿnite ring with an odd number of agents is frustrated because such periodicity can not ÿt along the chain. Eq. (4) can be used to construct a (deterministic) relaxation dynamics to adjust the p i 's climbing along the gradient of R i . We thus assume p i (t + 1) = p i (t) + p i and set 
Results

Self-segregation
In Fig. 1 we show the results of E = 2 =N as a function of the size parameter S deÿned as the ratio S = n=N obtained in several numerical experiments. The value for S = 1 corresponds to E EMG obtained for the EMG. In this section we only discuss results for N = 121. We have considered the topologies of a ring, a "square" torus (with N = 11 × 11), and of random graphs. In all the cases considered, the values of E S with S1 fulÿll E S ¡ E EMG . This feature is stressed in Fig. 1 with an horizontal line drawn at the value of E EMG . The value of E S for regular 1D and 2D lattices grows with S and for S 0:5 becomes even larger that E EMG .
The corresponding density distributions P(p) are shown in Fig. 2 for several values of S. These are compared with the distribution P EMG (p). We observe that P S (p) with S1 are always symmetric and U-shaped as P EMG (p) but they di er from this in the fact that they vanish around p = 1 2 . This agrees with the discussion given above for the linear chain. As we shortly discuss, this turns out to be a highly relevant and general feature of the LEMG. Such distributions are a better approximation to an ideal distribution
that yields the optimal value of E * EMG = 1=4N (and F * EMG = (1 + 1=N )=2). A noticeable dip is produced for S = (N − 2)=N . This can be understood in the following way. Assume that a symmetric distribution P(p) has already developed and two agents are removed in order that the ith player can check her decision in her neighborhood of N − 2 agents. If the two agents that have been removed have p ¿ 2 ) her choices of approaching 0 or 1 have equal probability. The net result once all players have updated her respective p's in the same fashion is to force the resultant P(p) to drop at p = 1 2 and grow at p =0; 1 as discussed for the linear chain. This argument can be extended for neighborhoods of other sizes.
The optimization problem
The shape of P S (p) changes with S. For intermediate values (for instance S = 81 121 ) this distribution has radically changed from the shape of a U to a two wing proÿle 3 There are other stationary solutions, such as a saw-tooth proÿle repeating the pattern p i±1 = 1 2 ∓ and p i = 1 2 . These solutions are also unstable. Fig. 2 . In the inset we display in a linear scale the same data up to 10,000 time steps, to put in evidence the presence of a fast and a slow dynamics.
with secondary maxima at both sides of p = 1 2 still keeping the fact that P S ( 1 2 ) = 0. This is associated to an increase in the number of "local winners". In fact after some time there are left almost no players that need to update their p i 's (see Fig. 3 ), while for S 0 or 1 the relaxation process reaches a dynamical equilibrium in which few players continuously update their p i 's.
For such intermediate values of S it is found that a minority is clearly deÿned in most neighborhoods and the corresponding agents are unambiguously induced to take one winning option. They therefore continue to accumulate points and cease to change their p i 's preventing the system to reach a more e cient self-segregation.
A situation like this has been extensively discussed in Ref. [8] . In these circumstances the relaxation process ceases to be e ective to lower the energy and the system freezes in a conÿguration that is far from a better local optimum. Although the frozen microstates do depend upon initial conditions, the asymptotic density P(p) is independent both because this is a density function that is associated with a macrostate of the system and because possible random variations are averaged out by repeating the relaxation process for a large ensemble of systems. Moreover, successive runs to obtain E changing the random initial conÿguration, yield essentially the same result. This is indeed to be expected because the energy is deÿned as the average of a statistical uctuation, as given in Eq. (3). The procedure to regain the true optimal self-segregation pattern, is to force the relaxation procedure by periodically removing the points that have been accumulated by every player, resetting their accounts to 0. This procedure changes only the situations in which the system is frozen but leaves unchanged situations in which this does not happen such as for instance for S 0 or 1.
These "annealing" episodes melt the system thus making it possible to reach the best local conÿgurations. We have performed an annealed relaxation (with a ÿxed annealing protocol) for all three topologies. The results are displayed with open symbols in all three panels of Fig. 1 . The uctuations in the lower curve of panel a) for S 0:6 disappear for N ¿ 500 thus indicating that it is a ÿnite size artifact of the model.
A remarkable result displayed in Fig. 1 is that the composition of local optima always yields a better coordination than the one obtained within the framework of the EMG in which all agents are involved in the same relaxation process.
There are actually two situations to consider. One in which S 0 or 1, and the other where S is within these two extreme values. In the ÿrst case the LEMG always yields remarkably lower values of E. This is indeed a general result, because holds true no matter the topology and the size of the system in which the players are located. In these cases no annealing is required because the system never gets quenched.
Outside the neighbourhood of S 0 or 1, the system gets quenched, and for regular topologies a poorer value of E (i.e., greater than E EMG ) is obtained. However, for such values a better (lower) value of E can always be obtained if the annealing procedure is used to force the relaxation process beyond the frozen states. This actually means that a better coordination, i.e., a lower frustration, is achieved whenever the system is found in a conÿguration that corresponds to a composition of good local optima, and this is true in the whole range of values of S. If good local optima are guaranteed one ÿnds values of E S that are signiÿcantly lower that E EMG . A typical value of E S 
The 2D case
A much richer situation is found for the case in which players are located on a grid with the topology of 2D torus. An example is shown in Fig. 4 in which N = 31 × 31. The values of p are associated to shades of gray. Frustration can be perceived in the fact that there is not a single global ordering of black (p 0) and white (p 1) stripes for the whole array. These are instead grouped in domains with di erent orientations or with the same orientation but shifted with respect to each other. The relaxation process is fast in an initial stage and slows down once the domains have fully developed. The domain walls are a source of frustration. In fact, when such stage has been reached all the agents that have 0 points and continue to update their p i 's are located in the domain walls giving rise to a slow dynamics in which walls move enlarging or shrinking domains. The whole picture resembles a crystallization process; for a value of S greater than a critical threshold, all domains collapse into a single pattern of stripes. Frustration shows up as an indented (fuzzy) border in some of the stripes. These results will be discussed in detail elsewhere.
Conclusions
We have studied the organization pattern achieved by many agents playing an EMG with local coordination. We ÿnd important di erences between the coordination achieved when the whole ensemble of agents participates in the same relaxation process or when local coordination is imposed.
According to the present results, the LEMG is an example in which a better coordination or, what is the same, a lower frustration, can be achieved provided that the self-organization is ruled by a local process, i.e., if agents govern their actions paying no attention to global trends of the system but rather to her immediate neighborhood. In the LEMG, this statement holds true even in the case in which very few agents are removed (S (N − 2)=N ) from the whole ensemble. The fact that a more e cient coordination is achieved by ignoring what happens to the total ensemble of players is expected to be a feature of a special kind of multi-agent systems. Other coordination problems may not behave in this fashion, thus allowing a classiÿcation of coordination games into classes linked to the type of optimization problem that is being "solved" by the ensemble of agents. Further investigation should be devoted to classify multi-agent games into those that fulÿll this property and those that can not be optimized by braking them into pieces.
It is found that the LEMG displays some of the features that are typical of antiferromagnetic systems including the emergence of domains, frustration, fast and slow dynamics, etc., while also keeping the essence of multiagent models, as applied to social or economic organization. It therefore sheds light on the connection between those two bodies of knowledge.
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